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Abstract 
 
It was hypothesized that (1) people’s attitudes will polarize more and have greater 
belief consistency with an increased amount of time for thought than with less 
amount of time for thought, (2) people’s attitudes will polarize more and have 
greater belief consistency when instructed to think about individuals rather than 
groups and given a high opportunity for thought, and (3) people’s attitudes will 
polarize more and have greater belief consistency when instructed to think about 
individuals rather than groups, are given a high opportunity for thought if those 
people have a low personal fear of invalidity rather than having a high personal fear 
of invalidity. We manipulated opportunity for thought and target. We measured the 
personal fear of invalidity as a moderator variable. We measured attitude 
polarization and belief consistency. Participants were directed to give initial 
impressions to descriptors of nonspecific individuals or groups. Participants were 
then directed to think about some of those descriptors as rebel insurgent individuals 
or groups. Although our hypotheses were not supported, other findings were 
significant. Plausible alternative explanations, limitations, and future directions are 
discussed. 
Introduction 
 
Reporters affiliated with the Associated Press generate news on a day to day basis 
on the United States’ current war against terror. Avoiding reading, watching, or hearing 
about daily events related to war against terror is difficult. Public opinion in the United 
States on its war against terror varies from extreme support to extreme disapproval. Some 
individuals initially supported war against terror because of events happening on 
September 11, 2001. Other individuals felt that the United States’ response was too 
extreme. Individual’s attitudes on the United States’ war against terror differed in both 
direction of opinion (i.e., for or against) and in intensity of opinion (i.e., extremity). Some 
individuals simply expressed their opinions about war against terror verbally. Yet, other 
individuals expressed their opinions on bumper-stickers. Finally, other individuals joined 
the U.S. armed-forces or rallied outside public offices. Perhaps individuals’ actions after 
events of September 11, 2001 may have reflected their attitudes about going to war. 
Perhaps individuals who joined our armed-forces or rallied held more extreme attitudes 
toward going to war than did individuals who simply put bumper-stickers on their 
vehicles. 
What would compel people to quit their jobs and join our military? Why would 
other people spend time away from work or family so they may protest outside public 
offices? Why would people engage in extreme actions based on their extreme attitudes? 
Some researchers suggest one explanation being self-generated attitude change which 
involves a process whereby people think about information (Tesser, 1978; Tesser, Martin, 
& Mendolia, 1995). People may find that when reconsidering what they know, they 
cannot recall every detail and so they fill in what is missing with what is consistent to 
 them. They may also remember information that does not make sense or is not clear, so 
they make that information consistent with what they already know. Additionally, they 
may hear something that is not consistent with what they know and choose to ignore what 
was said.  
Self-Generated Attitude Change 
Attitude polarization is one possible result from thinking about an attitude object 
(Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser et al., 1995). People sometimes discount information that 
is not consistent with what they already know (Tesser et al., 1995). People may also 
reinterpret information so that it is consistent with what they already know (Tesser et al., 
1995). Finally, people may generate information consistent with what they already know 
(Tesser et al., 1995).  
Generally speaking, people form an initial attitude about an object (e.g., a person, 
place, or idea). An attitude object may be any abstract idea (e.g., terror) or concrete object 
(e.g., a bomb) a person can imagine. Self-generated attitude change is a process whereby 
further thought results in a change of attitude extremity (see Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 
1995 for a review). After a person engages in thought about an attitude object, initially 
negative attitudes become more negative (Tesser et al., 1995). A person with an initially 
negative attitude about Osama bin Laden may have a more intense negative attitude about 
Osama bin Laden after thinking about him and remembering 9/11/2001. After a person 
engages in thought about an attitude object, initially positive attitudes become more 
positive (Tesser et al., 1995). A person with an initially positive attitude about New York 
Firefighters may have a more intense positive attitude about New York Firefighters after 
thinking about them and remembering 9/11/2001. 
An example of self-generated attitude change might begin with a man who turns 
on his television and sees a news station with a live video feed of the Twin Towers 
burning. This person hears a news reporter say that those claiming responsibility call 
themselves al Qaeda. This person’s initial thoughts may be of shock, fear, and anger. 
After viewing and hearing three days of nonstop media coverage, this person may have 
more intense feelings of anger and may harbor more hatred towards al Qaeda than if he 
had not been exposed to additional media coverage. A person who was presented with 
more frequent and widespread forms of media (e.g., newspapers, radio, and television) 
was induced to think more about the attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 than he 
normally would think about the attack. After he thought about this attack, his beliefs 
became more extreme than they would have been had he not thought about this attack. 
After his beliefs became extreme, his feelings became more extreme than his initial 
feelings. Consequently, his resulting attitudes became more extreme than his initial 
attitudes. 
Macroprocesses 
The first macroprocess in self-generated attitude change is that after people 
engage in thought about an attitude object, their beliefs about that attitude object change 
(Tesser, 1978). Thinking (i.e., thought) results in a more consistent belief than a person’s 
initial belief without thought (Tesser, 1978). Thought is not static; it is a dynamic and 
creative process (Tesser et al., 1995). Thought can be better compared to an artist 
painting a picture as opposed to a computer pulling files. An example of how thought and 
beliefs are related might be a woman thinking about events of September 11, 2001. While 
thinking, she visualizes the Twin Towers burning. She “paints” more details about this 
 scene while thinking about the Twin Towers than without thinking: flames roaring out of 
broken windows grow larger, smoke billowing up into the heavens becomes darker and 
increasingly consuming. She now recalls people hurling themselves out windows to avoid 
being burned by fire. She becomes tense while thinking about this scene. Her heart starts 
beating fast, and she starts believing what she “painted” in her mind actually happened. 
She believes her thoughts, even if the scene in her mind is more exaggerated or extreme 
than what actually occurred. As this woman thought about this scene, she started 
believing thoughts tied to these events. If this woman was given more time to think in 
this fashion, her attitudes would become more extreme than if given less or no time to 
think in this fashion. 
The second macroprocess of self-generated attitude change is how a change in 
people’s feelings is contingent upon a change in people’s beliefs (Tesser, 1978). What 
people believe to be true about an attitude object is correlated to how you feel about that 
attitude object. In the previous example, we can begin to understand why this woman 
may feel terrified, angry, or sorrowful. This woman may think about how hundreds of 
people died by being burned alive or by being crushed by tons of debris. Compared to her 
initial beliefs, this woman’s beliefs about 9/11/2001 are more extreme during thought. 
With a change in beliefs, she feels what happened on 9/11/2001 was more terrible 
compared to her initial beliefs. 
Microprocesses 
Generation of consistent beliefs is one of three microprocesses by which people 
may experience attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978). As time progresses, people forget 
details. We tend to fill in missing information when asked to think about something that 
is familiar to us. If details are missing, people tend to generate consistent details with 
other information they possess. If people generate consistent thoughts, people may 
experience attitude polarization because details people generate tend to support 
knowledge those people already possess.  
For example, imagine that this same woman thought again about events of 
9/11/2001. If she perceived this situation to be disastrous in nature, emergency personnel 
in emergency vehicles would be near the Twin Towers to assist in any way possible. 
Even if this woman did not specifically recall an individual siren, she may think of what a 
typical police car siren sounds like and incorporate this sound into her memory of that 
day. She has generated consistent beliefs and has created a more coherent (i.e., more 
stable) memory as compared to a less coherent memory produced by inconsistent beliefs 
or no beliefs. 
Generation of additional beliefs and opportunity for thought were manipulated in 
a study by Tesser and Cowan (1975). Participants were given either four or eight 
adjectives describing a fictitious person. Participants then indicated their initial attitudes 
about that fictitious person. When given opportunity for thought, participants generated 
additional beliefs about that fictitious person. Generation of additional beliefs appeared 
more when participants were given fewer initial details about an attitude object than 
when participants were given a greater amount of initial details. When distracted from 
thought, participants generated fewer additional beliefs about that fictitious person as 
compared to participants given opportunity for thought. This idea that attitudes polarize 
less when people are distracted as compared to when people are given time for thought is 
 supported by many studies (e.g., Leone 1995; see also Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Millar & 
Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). 
Reinterpretation of inconsistent information is the second of three microprocesses 
people may experience attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978). Reinterpretation occurs when 
people assume a meaning from an ambiguous piece of information that is consistent with 
information they already possess. People may initially perceive a detail in a way that is 
ambiguous with how they view an attitude object. People may “rethink” what happened 
and change a certain detail around to make an ambiguous detail consistent with other 
information they possess. People using reinterpretation may experience attitude 
polarization.  
For example, maybe this same woman is reminiscing events of 9/11/2001 with a 
man. He makes an ambiguous (i.e., open to interpretation) statement: “I don’t believe 
what they said about President Bush.” Depending on this woman’s initial attitudes toward 
President Bush, she may reinterpret what this man said in many ways. Tesser (1978) 
suggests that if this woman held an initially positive attitude toward President Bush, she 
will reinterpret this man’s ambiguous statement to be positive toward President Bush 
(e.g., I love President Bush’s tactics). In contrast, if this woman held an initially negative 
attitude toward President Bush, she will reinterpret this man’s ambiguous statement to be 
negative toward President Bush (e.g., I hate President Bush’s tactics). 
In one study, Tesser and Cowan manipulated reinterpretation of ambiguous 
information and opportunity for thought (1977). Participants were given sets of three 
adjectives describing a fictitious person. Two of these adjectives were either positive or 
negative and one of these adjectives was neutral. Participants were asked to indicate their 
initial attitudes about this fictitious person. Participants were then either given 90 seconds 
of thought or distraction. Participants given an opportunity for thought polarized more as 
compared to distracted participants. If participants were given two positive adjectives, 
they tended to infer that ambiguous adjective was also positive. If participants were given 
two negative adjectives, they had a tendency to infer that ambiguous adjective was also 
negative. Reinterpretation of ambiguous information has been replicated in previous 
studies (e.g., Leone, 1996; Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Cowan, 1977). 
Discounting of inconsistent beliefs is the last microprocess by which people may 
experience attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978). People using discounting may disregard 
information that is not consistent with information they already have. Discounting 
happens when people are presented with information that is not consistent with 
information they already have. Discounting may occur when someone simply ignores 
information.  
For example, a woman is talking to a man. He states “The New York Fire 
Department did such a lousy job. They let all those people die!” Assuming this woman 
had initially positive attitudes toward the New York Fire Department, she would find 
information given by this man to be inconsistent with her beliefs and would discount that 
information. Because a man stated information that conflicted with information this 
woman had, his information would not perceived as relevant and would therefore 
disregarded.   
In a study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), discounting of inconsistent beliefs 
and participants’ beliefs about the death penalty were manipulated. Participants were 
asked to indicate their beliefs (i.e., for or against) about the death penalty. Participants 
 were then given a fictitious study arguing for or against the death penalty. Participants 
were then asked to indicate how well or poorly this study was conducted and how 
convincing evidence seemed. Participants were then given a second fictitious study 
presenting an opposite view about the death penalty. As before, participants were asked 
to indicate how well or poorly this study was conducted and how convincing evidence 
seemed. After reading both articles, participants reported that articles supporting their 
beliefs were more convincing than articles not supporting participants’ beliefs. Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper found that attitude shifts taking place in participants resulted in attitude 
polarization (1979). Further research on discounting of inconsistent beliefs can be found 
in additional studies (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Leone, 1996; Millar & Tesser, 1986; 
Tesser, 1978). 
People may generate information, reinterpret information, and discount 
information as they reexamine their body of knowledge pertaining to an attitude object. 
People reexamining their beliefs about an attitude object may generate a piece of 
information consistent with information they already possess about that attitude object. 
People reexamining their beliefs about an attitude object may reinterpret some ambiguous 
information to be consistent with other information about that attitude object. People 
reexamining their beliefs about an attitude object may discount some information 
inconsistent with other information about that attitude object. All three microprocesses 
may result in increased belief consistency which in turn results in self-generated attitude 
change. Different people may use all three or a combination of these three 
microprocesses during thought (Tesser, 1978). 
Schemas 
Microprocesses are means by which peoples’ attitudes polarize: generation, 
reinterpretation, and discounting (Judd & Brauer, 1995; Millar & Tesser, 1986). Schemas 
are structures within which peoples’ attitudes polarize. Experimenters have found a 
relationship between schemas and attitude polarization in many studies (e.g., Judd & 
Brauer, 1995; Lassiter & Apple, 1998; Leone & Ensley, 1986; Sadler & Tesser, 1973; 
Tesser & Leone, 1976). Tesser (1978) suggests that without schemas, little attitude 
polarization may take place. In contrast, if a well-developed schema exists, more 
polarization should take place. 
According to Tesser (1978), schemas are mental representations of stimulus 
domains (i.e., attitude objects). Attitude objects may have a large number of attributes 
associated with them and people may have a large amount of knowledge about attitude 
objects (Tesser, 1978). Fiske and Taylor defined schemas as “…a cognitive structure that 
represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the 
relations among the attributes” (1991, p. 98). That is, schemas are naïve theories about an 
attitude object (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Kelley, 1967; Ross, 1977). Another way of 
explaining schemas is by comparing them to blueprints. People use blueprints for 
information about structure and rules for building objects. People use schemas for 
thinking about and filling in details about attitude objects.  
Because people cannot focus on every detail of even simple attitude objects, 
people use schemas to simplify thinking processes (Tesser, 1978). This thinking process 
is simplified because people no longer need to think about every detail. People using 
schemas may be drawn to relevant information and experience a reduction of uncertainty 
when presented with ambiguous information (Tesser et al., 1995). Because schemas come 
 equipped with details about an attitude object, people may also be able to fill in missing 
information and draw conclusions about an attitude object using details from schemas 
(Lord, Paulson, Sia, Thomas, & Lepper, 2004; Tesser, 1978). 
Recall, from above examples, a woman is reminiscing about events happening on 
9/11/2001. Perhaps she is again asked to think about events on 9/11/2001. She may 
employ schemas to remember other information. She may think about that day and recall 
seeing broken windows and debris on the ground around her. She may not have actually 
seen those details until generating that information. Broken windows and debris on the 
ground are consistent with other disaster information from that day. Because she is using 
schemas, she will stay within certain boundaries when recalling information. Chances are 
small she will recall having seen a kangaroo parade walking down Greenwich Street. 
Even though she may not have perfect memory, a kangaroo parade walking down 
Greenwich Street while airliners were crashing into the Twin Towers is unlikely. A 
memory with a kangaroo parade does not fit a “disaster schema” or a “typical day in New 
York City schema.” If she were to generate this thought, she may just as quickly discount 
it because of irrelevancy. Thus, even if events of that day were very blurred for this 
woman, she would have a low chance of recalling a kangaroo parade. Instead, this 
woman may use a “disaster schema” of a scenario where she may recall seeing people 
run and people hearing loud sirens wailing. Further, she may have recalled an otherwise 
ambiguous memory. This memory may be one such as people yelling to one another. In 
terms of this situation however, she may reinterpret that yelling as having to do with the 
current disaster rather than any other context. She is using schemas to think about and fill 
in past experiences in her memory. That is, she may be filling in details by calling upon a 
schema relating to a disaster scenario.  
There are different parts of schemas to reflect different kinds of memory (e.g., 
semantic or episodic). Schemas are composed of three types of information: semantic, 
episodic, and affective (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Tulving, 1972; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). 
These types of information are not isolated. As information of one kind (e.g., semantic) is 
made available (i.e., created by generation of information) through any of the 
microprocesses, that information also activates other types of information (e.g., episodic 
or affective).  
Tulving (1972) proposed that semantic information is declarative in nature (See 
also Carlston & Smith, 1996). Semantic information pertains to information with a verbal 
quality (i.e., statements and facts) (Carlson, 2008; Carlston & Smith, 1996). Semantic 
information may be comprised of general facts about an attitude object. People may use 
semantic information to describe an attitude object’s traits. For example, a woman is 
asked to think about terrorists. Someone asks this woman to describe some traits or 
characteristics terrorists might have. After thinking for a moment, this woman may reply 
with these attributes: fanatical, dangerous, suicide bomber, gunman, killer. She used a 
schema to think about what “terrorists” meant to her. Using a schema enables her to 
semantically describe what terrorists are to her. 
Tulving (1972) proposed that episodic information is contextual in nature (i.e., 
seen from the perspective of a perceiver) (See also Carlston & Smith, 1996). Episodic 
information pertains to information with an audio and visual quality (e.g., a person or 
place) (Carlson, 2008; Carlston & Smith, 1996). Episodic information may include 
images or scenes from a stored memory. People may use episodic information to describe 
 other peoples’ behaviors. For example, perhaps this same woman is asked to think about 
terrorists again. This time, someone asks this woman to picture in her mind any physical 
characteristics terrorists might have. After thinking a moment, she may picture the 
following characteristics: men covered in tan-colored clothing and rags, some yelling in a 
foreign language, AK-47 machine guns held in the air and firing, a rocket-propelled 
grenade launcher being fired, an explosion. She used a schema to picture “terrorists” in 
her mind. Doing so enabled her to picture other things linked to that word and 
episodically picture terrorists. 
Zanna and Rempel (1988) proposed that affective information pertains to 
information with an evaluative quality. Affective information may be comprised of 
emotional reactions to an attitude object (Carlston & Smith, 1996). People may use 
affective information to take a negative, positive, or ambivalent stance toward an attitude 
object. For example, once again this woman is asked to think about terrorists. This time 
someone asks this woman how she feels about terrorists. After thinking a moment, she 
may say that she hates terrorists. She used a schema to evaluate “terrorist” in her mind. 
Doing so enabled her to give an emotional response triggered from affective information. 
Different forms of information are not isolated from one another. Affective and 
cognitive components of peoples’ thought processes work together when people form an 
attitude toward an attitude object (Leone, Taylor, & Adams, 1991; McGuire, 1985; 
Stephan, 1985). A memory or experience may be especially strong when people call upon 
all three kinds of information (i.e., semantic, episodic, and affective). For example, 
recalling someone yell “watch out for falling glass!” may help people remember seeing 
glass and debris fall. Recalling someone yell this statement (i.e., semantic) and recalling 
seeing it as it happened (i.e., episodic) may help people recall what they felt at that 
moment (i.e., affective). Each kind of information (i.e., semantic, episodic, and affective) 
that is related to another kind of information (i.e., pertaining to the same attitude object) 
strengthens an overall memory. People with a memory supported by each kind of 
information may experience more attitude polarization than people with a memory not 
supported by each kind of information. 
Schema Complexity 
Schema complexity can be described in terms of volume (i.e., amount of 
information related to an attitude object). Schema complexity increases as the number of 
independent pieces of information pertaining to an attitude object increases (Chaiken & 
Yates, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Detail and complexity are 
related in terms of amount of accessible information related to an attitude object. For 
example, some researchers found support for a view that people have more complex 
schemas to assist in thinking about individual’s personality as compared to less complex 
schemas to assist in thinking about group’s personality (e.g., Britton & Tesser, 1982; 
Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). When thinking about an individual (e.g., 
Osama bin Laden), people may be able to come up with more highly detailed information 
(e.g., personality traits, visuals, and emotions) about that individual than when people 
think about groups of people (e.g., al Qaeda).  
People using more complex schemas have a greater chance of experiencing 
attitude change compared to people using less complex schemas (Tesser et al., 1995). 
Tesser and Leone (1977) found support for schema complexity in that more polarization 
occurred during thought conditions when people have more complex schemas compared 
 to conditions in which people have less complex schemas or in which people are in 
distraction conditions (See also Leone & Aronow, 1992; Leone & Ensley, 1985; Munro 
& Ditto, 1997; Clary, Tesser & Downing, 1978; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Related to this 
difference between individual and group schema complexity, attitude polarization occurs 
more in an evaluation of individual personality than in an evaluation of group personality 
(Leone & Ensley, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986). Attitude change occurs more often when 
thinking about individuals than when thinking about groups because of a greater number 
of accessible cognitions (i.e., attention grasping) surround individuals than groups. For 
example, people are better able to picture Osama bin Laden than al Qaeda in their minds 
and are thus better able to form attitudes toward Osama bin Laden than al Qaeda. 
Individuals may be better able to produce descriptive information regarding that 
one terrorist (e.g., Osama bin Laden) than groups of terrorists (e.g., al Qaeda). Individuals 
may be better able to produce semantic, episodic, and affective information regarding that 
one terrorist than about groups of terrorists (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Tulving, 1972; 
Zanna & Rempel, 1988). People may be better able to generate consistent information, 
reinterpret ambiguous information, and discount inconsistent information regarding an 
individual terrorist than about groups of terrorists (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Millar & 
Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Cowan, 1975). People thinking about an individual terrorist may 
be more likely to experience attitude polarization than are people thinking about groups 
of terrorists (Tesser et al., 1995; Valenti & Tesser, 1981). Given the aforementioned 
variations in thinking about one terrorist verses groups of terrorists, some individuals are 
more likely to experience these variations than other individuals. 
Personal Fear of Invalidity 
People may experience effects of self-generated attitude change to a greater or 
lesser extent due to individual differences such as the personal fear of invalidity. Personal 
fear of invalidity is an individual’s comfort, or lack there of, in being wrong about 
attitude objects (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001). People high in 
personal fear of invalidity may not be willing to commit to an attitude about attitude 
objects without knowing as much as those people can about that topic (Clow & Esses, 
2005; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Thompson et al., 2001). Conversely, 
people low in personal fear of invalidity may be willing to commit to an attitude about 
attitude objects without knowing as much as those people can about that topic (Clow & 
Esses, 2005; Freund et al., 1985; Thompson et al., 2001). For example, perhaps a woman 
and a man are talking about rebel insurgents in the Middle East. If this woman was high 
in personal fear of invalidity as compared to low in personal fear of invalidity, she may 
be cautious when making statements about those rebel insurgents. She may be 
increasingly cautious when making statements about rebel insurgents if her knowledge 
base is small. If this woman was low in personal fear of invalidity as compared to high in 
personal fear of invalidity, she may be hasty when making statements about those rebel 
insurgents. She may be increasingly hasty when making statements about rebel insurgents 
regardless of her knowledge base size. 
In a study by Freund et al. (1985), experimenters found additional information 
regarding “freezing” and “unfreezing” of people’s first impressions on an attitude objects. 
Having an initial belief and sticking with it despite available information that might lead 
to a different belief is freezing (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Having an initial belief and 
modifying it due to available information leading to a different belief is unfreezing 
 (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). People sometimes freeze on initial information regarding 
an attitude object (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).  
For example, a group of people may have never heard of Osama bin Laden prior 
to the events of September 11, 2001. That group of people’s first impressions of him was 
then connected with attacks on the United States. If this group is presented with and they 
ignore information that Osama bin Laden is a righteous liberator, they have frozen to 
their first negative impressions. Conversely, if this group is presented with and they 
accept information that Osama bin Laden is a righteous liberator, they have unfrozen 
from their first negative impressions. Whether people “freeze” on a belief or idea depends 
on their personal fear of invalidity (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
Freund et al. (1985) found that people high in personal fear of invalidity tended to not 
freeze upon a belief due to their reluctance to commit to a potentially incorrect belief. 
Freund et al. (1985) found that people low in personal fear of invalidity tended to freeze 
upon a belief due to their haste to commit to a potentially incorrect belief. 
When applying the above reasoning to self-generated attitude change in general, 
one may infer that because people high in personal fear of invalidity are not likely to 
freeze upon a belief, those people will also not polarize when thinking about an attitude 
object (Thompson & Zanna, 1995). One may also infer that because people low in 
personal fear of invalidity are likely to freeze upon a belief, those people will also 
polarize when thinking about an attitude object. People high in personal fear of invalidity 
may not freeze because they seek out information that may either be consistent or 
inconsistent with their initial beliefs (Freund, et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). People low in personal fear of invalidity may freeze 
upon a belief because they either don’t seek out more information or they seek out 
information consistent with their initial beliefs (Freund, et al., 1985; Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). People high in personal fear of invalidity 
seek information both consistent and inconsistent with initial beliefs to validate an 
opinion. People low in personal fear of invalidity seek information to validate an opinion, 
but this information is consistent with their initial beliefs. 
Self-generated attitude change may be examined in particular by its’ 
microprocesses in general. Generation of consistent information, reinterpretation of 
ambiguous information, and discounting of inconsistent information may lead people to 
polarize in their evaluation of an attitude object (Tesser, 1978). People high in personal 
fear of invalidity may generate information both consistent and inconsistent to their initial 
beliefs (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987, 1988). People low in personal fear of invalidity 
may generate only information consistent to their initial beliefs (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 
1987, 1988). People high in personal fear of invalidity may reinterpret ambiguous 
information to be either consistent or inconsistent with their initial beliefs (Kruglanski & 
Mayseless, 1988). People low in personal fear of invalidity may reinterpret ambiguous 
information to be consistent with their initial beliefs (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988). 
People high in personal fear of invalidity may discount information only if that 
information does not make sense to them or if it truly seems invalid (Kruglanski & 
Mayseless, 1988). People low in personal fear of invalidity may discount information if 
that information is not consistent with their other information (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 
1988). By having inconsistent information, people high in personal fear of invalidity will 
tend to attenuate in affect regarding an attitude object (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987; 
 Thompson & Zanna, 1995). By having consistent information, people low in personal 
fear of invalidity will tend to polarize in affect regarding an attitude object (Kruglanski & 
Mayseless, 1987; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). 
For example, perhaps a woman high in personal fear of invalidity has an initial 
belief that Osama bin Laden is a terrorist. She may think about everything that motivates 
him. This information may be both consistent (e.g., he hates the United States) and 
inconsistent (e.g., he is trying to save his people from oppression) with her initial beliefs. 
After using thought generation, reinterpretation, and discounting, she may have 
additional information, but some of that information may be inconsistent with her initial 
beliefs. Because she now has information that conflicts with her initial beliefs, she may 
attenuate her beliefs toward Osama bin Laden. 
Perhaps a woman low in personal fear of invalidity has an initial belief that 
Osama bin Laden is a terrorist. She may think about everything that motivates him, 
information that is consistent (e.g., he hates the United States) with her initial beliefs. 
After using thought generation, reinterpretation, and discounting, she may have 
additional information consistent with her initial beliefs. She may polarize her beliefs 
toward Osama bin Laden because she now has additional information that is consistent 
with her initial beliefs. This woman used schemas and microprocesses of self-generated 
attitude change when thinking about Osama bin Laden. Perhaps a different woman high 
in personal fear of invalidity has an initial belief that Osama bin Laden is a terrorist. She 
may think about everything that motivates him, information that is consistent (e.g., he 
hates the United States) with her initial beliefs. After using thought generation, 
reinterpretation, and discounting, she may have additional information consistent and 
inconsistent with her initial beliefs. She may attenuate her beliefs toward Osama bin 
Laden because she now has additional information that is consistent and inconsistent with 
her initial beliefs. This woman used schemas and microprocesses of self-generated 
attitude change when thinking about Osama bin Laden.  
In summary, people use schemas as guidelines when thinking about an attitude 
object (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Tesser, 1978). Attitude 
polarization begins with thought and people use schemas to guide that thought process 
(Judd & Brauer, 1995, Leone & Ensley, 1986; Sadler & Tesser, 1973). People are 
different and tend to think differently. One way people differ is in terms of fear of being 
wrong. People may seek information differently or in different amounts as fear of being 
wrong increases or decreases.  
People high in personal fear of invalidity may seek information about an attitude 
object thereby increasing schema complexity before committing to a belief about that 
attitude object (Clow & Esses, 2005; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987; Thompson & 
Zanna, 1995). Compared to people low in personal fear of invalidity, people high in 
personal fear of invalidity may have a complex schema, but that schema has some 
inconsistent information (Clow & Esses, 2005; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). Results 
from having an inconsistent schema may be attitude attenuation (Tesser & Leone, 1977; 
Tesser et al., 1995). People low in personal fear of invalidity may not seek information 
about an attitude object thereby not increasing schema complexity (Clow & Esses, 2005; 
Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). Compared to people high in 
personal fear of invalidity, people low in personal fear of invalidity may have a complex 
schema, but that schema has largely consistent information (Clow & Esses, 2005; 
 Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). Results from having a consistent schema may be attitude 
polarization (Tesser & Leone, 1977; Tesser et al., 1995). Given the aforementioned 
information, three possible hypotheses may be predicted: H1 People’s attitudes will 
polarize more and have greater belief consistency with an increased amount of time for 
thought than with less amount of time for thought. H2 People’s attitudes will polarize 
more and have greater belief consistency when instructed to think about individuals 
rather than groups and given a high opportunity for thought. H3 People’s attitudes will 
polarize more and have greater belief consistency when instructed to think about 
individuals rather than groups, are given a high opportunity for thought, and have a low 
personal fear of invalidity rather than having a high personal fear of invalidity. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants volunteered for a study titled “Individual Differences in Perceptions 
of People.” There were a total of 123 (34 males, 89 females) participants. Participants 
were recruited with an incentive of extra credit in their undergraduate psychology and 
honors classes. This study was one of several means by which undergraduate students 
could earn extra credit for their classes. 
Most participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 years old (68.1%). Most 
participants indicated they were Caucasian (65.5%). Participants indicated a political 
affiliation of Democratic (23.3%), Independent (8.6%), Republican (28.4%), or no party 
affiliation (38.8%). Moderate scores were needed to measure attitude polarization 
because attitude polarization is measured by comparing any change from initial 
responses. The experimenter in this study randomly assigned participants to experimental 
conditions. He also obtained a signed written informed consent from each participant. All 
participants were treated in accordance with the American Psychological Association’s 
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological 
Association, 2003). 
Procedure 
A male experimenter greeted participants individually and informed participants 
that this study was designed to assess impressions of people. He informed participants of 
any potential risks and benefits associated with taking part in this study. He also informed 
participants that participation in this study was voluntary and that they had a right to 
withdraw from this study at any time without penalty. He explained that participants’ 
responses would be kept confidential and participants’ identities would remain 
anonymous. He asked participants if they had any questions. After answering any 
questions, he then asked participants to read and sign an informed consent document. 
He then placed a 15-point Likert-type scale directly in front of participants. 
Endpoints of this scale were labeled strongly favorable (+7) and strongly unfavorable (-
7) with a midpoint labeled neutral (0). Intermediate points were labeled moderately 
favorable (+4) and moderately unfavorable (-4). The experimenter in this study explained 
the use of this scale and answered any questions from the directions given. Participants 
were told to express their impressions aloud by saying a number (e.g., +6, -3). 
He individually presented participants with 30 sets of descriptor words on 7.3 cm 
by 13.3 cm cards. Four descriptor words (e.g., talented, independent, unconventional, 
humorous) were printed on each card. Fifteen descriptor cards had three positive 
attributes (e.g., imaginative, loyal, skilled) and one neutral attribute (e.g., ordinary). 
 Fifteen descriptor cards had three negative attributes (e.g., authoritative, unintelligent, 
resentful) and one neutral attribute (e.g., mediocre). The experimenter in this study chose 
all attributes, each rated on likeableness, from a list of 555 personality-trait words (cf., 
Anderson, 1968). 
The experimenter in this study presented each card by placing it in front of 
participants and asked participants to look at that descriptor set. He told participants to 
think about that descriptor set in terms of either an individual or a group of individuals. 
He also told participants that each card represented a different individual or group of 
individuals. He asked participants to rate how they felt about that descriptor set using that 
15-point Likert-type scale. If participants did not indicate how they felt about a descriptor 
set, he prompted them by asking how they felt. After participants indicated their 
impressions, he recorded participants’ initial impressions on a separate coding sheet. 
Participants were not able to view notes taken by him. This procedure was repeated for 
all remaining descriptor sets. 
After participants read all sets of descriptors and indicated their initial impression 
toward each descriptor set, the experimenter in this study randomly chose two descriptor 
sets for which participants indicated a moderately favorable impression (i.e., +4) and two 
descriptor sets for which participants indicated a moderately unfavorable impression (i.e., 
-4). If participants had not indicated moderately favorable or unfavorable impression (i.e., 
+4 or -4) toward any descriptor set, he chose a participants’ next closest rating (e.g., +3 
or -5). 
The experimenter in this study randomly assigned participants to one of four 
conditions. Participants in condition one received a low opportunity for thought (i.e., 30 
seconds of thought) and were also asked to think about descriptors in terms of an 
individual rebel insurgent (cf. Leone et al., 1991). Participants in condition two received 
a low opportunity for thought and were asked to think about descriptors in terms of an 
entire group of rebel insurgents. Participants in condition three received a high 
opportunity for thought (i.e., 90 seconds of thought) and were asked to think about 
descriptors in terms of an individual rebel insurgent (cf. Leone et al., 1991). Participants 
in condition four received a high opportunity for thought and were asked to think about 
descriptors in terms of an entire group of rebel insurgents. 
The experimenter in this study asked participants to focus all of their thinking on 
each descriptor in terms of either an individual Rebel Insurgent or a group of Rebel 
Insurgents. Specifically, he told participants 
I’d like you to take some time to think about one of these descriptions. I 
want you to concentrate all of your thoughts on this [group or individual] 
during the time I give you. You might want to think about how you feel 
about a [group or individual] with these characteristics. You might want to 
think about [groups or individuals] you know fit this description. Or you 
might want to think about what other qualities and traits [group or 
individuals] like this may have. Just concentrate on this description and 
continue thinking until I tell you to stop (Leone, 1996).  
After he gave these instructions to participants and gave them an opportunity for 
thought, he put a Likert-type scale directly in front of participants. He then asked 
participants to again indicate their impressions toward that descriptor set using that 15-
point Likert-type scale. Specifically, he told participants 
 Now that you’ve had a chance to collect your thoughts, I’d like you to 
once again indicate how you feel. Sometimes people’s feelings change 
even over a short period of time as this. Of course, you may or may not 
feel the same way about the [group or individual]. Using the scale as 
before, indicate how you feel about the [group or individual] now (Leone, 
1996). 
Participants indicated their responses upon a 15-point Likert-type scale and he recorded 
each response. He recorded participants’ responses on a separate sheet of paper and 
prevented participants from viewing that sheet of paper. He repeated this process (i.e., 
thought and re-rating) until all three remaining descriptor cards were viewed by 
participants. 
He measured participants’ impression change in the following way (cf. Tesser, 
1978). If participants’ initial impression changed from moderately favorable (+4) to less 
favorable (e.g., +3, +2) or if participants’ initial impression changed from moderately 
unfavorable (-4) to more favorable (e.g., -3, -2) following a period of thought, he 
assigned a score of “-1” to indicate impression attenuation. If participants’ initial 
impressions did not change following a period of thought, he assigned a score of “0” to 
indicate no impression attenuation or polarization. If participants’ initial impressions 
changed from moderately favorable (+4) to more favorable (e.g., +5, +6) or if 
participants’ initial impressions changed from moderately unfavorable (-4) to less 
favorable (e.g., -5, -6) following a period of thought, he assigned a score of “+1” to 
indicate impression polarization. Individual scores were recorded and were not visible to 
participants.  
The experimenter in this study manipulated beliefs by assessing participants’ 
thoughts after completing the thought assessment portion of the survey. Change in belief 
was measured by thought listing (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1981; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & 
Ernst, 1997). Participants were asked to list everything that came to mind when presented 
with each descriptor set. Participants wrote on a piece of paper each thought that came to 
mind within a predetermined amount of time for each card. Participants were asked to 
make a check next to a thought if they had a single thought more than once (cf. Cacioppo 
et al., 1997). The experimenter in this study assessed beliefs by reviewing participants’ 
list of thoughts and assigning a “+” to indicate a positive thought, a “0” to indicate a 
neutral thought, or a “-” to indicate a negative thought. He assessed participants’ personal 
fear of invalidity after completing this section. 
Individual differences in the personal fear of invalidity were assessed using the 
14-item Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale (Thompson et al., 2001). Responses to each of 
the statements were made using a 5-point Likert scale with response options labeled from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Of the 14 items in the Personal Fear of Invalidity 
Scale, nine items were worded such that agreement indicated a high personal fear of 
invalidity (e.g., “I prefer situations where I do not have to decide immediately.”). The 
remaining five items were worded such that disagreement indicated a high personal fear 
of invalidity (e.g., “Decisions rarely weigh heavily on my shoulders.”). 
Responses to items for which disagreement indicated a high personal fear of 
invalidity were reverse scored. Answers to all items were scored such that higher scores 
indicated a higher personal fear of invalidity. Scores for answers to individual items were 
summed such that higher total scores indicated a higher personal fear of invalidity. The 
 experimenter in this study classified participants as either high or low in personal fear of 
invalidity based on a median split of the full range of scores on the Personal Fear of 
Invalidity Scale. 
Several researchers have found Cronbach's alphas of .84 or more for scores on the 
Personal Need for Invalidity Scale (e.g., Leary, Sheppard, McNeil, Jenkins, & Barnes, 
1986; Thompson et al., 2001). Sadowski & Gulgoz (1992) found over a seven week 
interval a test-retest correlation of .88 for scores on the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale. 
Researchers found that scores on the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale are positively 
correlated with scores on measures of attention given to tasks (e.g., Osberg, 1987), 
information seeking and usage in problem solving (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), 
and motivation for experiences that are thought provoking (e.g., Venkatraman & Price, 
1990). Researchers found that scores on the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale are 
uncorrelated with scores on measures of dogmatism (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), need 
for closure (e.g., Petty & Jarvis, 1996), and preference for order (e.g., Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). The experimenter in this study obtained a Cronbach's alpha of .80 in 
this sample for scores on the Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale. 
After the individual differences portion of this survey, the experimenter in this 
study included some questions designed to assess participants’ demographic information. 
He first asked to indicate their sex between two options labeled male or female. He then 
asked participants to indicate their age with response options labeled 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 
33-37, 38 or older. He asked participants to indicate their race with response options 
labeled African American / Black, Asian / Pacific Islander, Caucasian / White, Hispanic / 
Latino, Other. He also asked participants to indicate their political affiliation with 
response options labeled Democrat, Independent, Republican, or No Party Affiliation. 
The experimenter in this study asked participants some questions that served as a 
manipulation check upon completion of answering demographic questions. He directed 
some questions at participants’ attention to detail to specific portions of the survey (e.g., 
Did you think of any particular people or groups? Why?) and some questions at 
participants’ attention to the survey as a whole (e.g., What did you think we were looking 
at in this study?). He also asked whether participants’ felt the same or different (e.g., Do 
you think that your attitude changed or remained similar when you had time to think 
about the people?). He debriefed all participants as to the purpose of this study at the 
conclusion of post-experiment questions. 
Results 
Overview 
This study was a 2 (opportunity for thought: high vs. low) x 2 (target: individual 
vs. group) x 2 (personal fear of invalidity: high vs. low) x 2 (affect: initially favorable vs. 
initially unfavorable attitude) factorial design. Between-subjects variables in this study 
were opportunity for thought, target, and the personal fear of invalidity. The within- 
subjects variable in study was initial affect. The dependent variables in this study were 
attitude polarization and belief consistency. All participants’ scores on measures of 
attitude polarization and belief consistency were analyzed using a 2 (opportunity for 
thought) x 2 (target) x 2 (personal need for invalidity) x 2 (affect) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). 
Main Analysis 
 It was hypothesized that participants would experience greater attitude 
polarization and belief consistency when they were given a high opportunity for thought 
rather than a low opportunity for thought. A main effect was expected for opportunity for 
thought. It was also hypothesized that participants would experience greater attitude 
polarization and belief consistency when given a high opportunity for thought rather than 
a low opportunity for thought and instructed to think about individuals rather than think 
about groups of individuals. A two-way interaction was expected between opportunity for 
thought and target. Finally, it was hypothesized that participants with a low personal fear 
of invalidity would experience greater attitude polarization and belief consistency than 
would participants with a high personal fear of invalidity when given a high opportunity 
for thought (rather than a low opportunity for thought) and instructed to think about 
individuals (rather than groups). A three-way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, target, and the personal fear of invalidity was expected. 
Attitude Polarization. As a whole, there was no support for our hypotheses 
concerning attitude polarization. First, there was no significant main effect for 
opportunity for thought, F < 1.00. Second, there also was no significant interaction 
between opportunity for thought and target of thought, F < 1.00. Last, there was no 
significant interaction between opportunity for thought, target of thought, and the 
personal fear of invalidity, F < 1.00. 
However, there were some unexpected effects. The following effects were 
between-subjects effects. There was a significant main effect for the personal fear of 
invalidity, F(1, 108) = 3.81, p < .05. Participants low in the personal fear of invalidity 
experienced attitude attenuation (M = -.44, SD = .96) and participants high in the personal 
fear of invalidity experienced attitude polarization (M = .11, SD = 1.05). There was a 
significant interaction between opportunity for thought and the personal fear of invalidity, 
F(1, 108) = 4.50, p < .04. There was no simple main effect of the personal fear of 
invalidity (low personal fear of invalidity: M = -.41, SD = 1.28; high personal fear of 
invalidity: M = -.58, SD = 1.36) when there was a low opportunity for thought. There was 
a significant simple main effect of the personal fear of invalidity when there was a high 
opportunity for thought. When given high opportunity for thought, participants low in the 
personal fear of invalidity became more attenuated (M = -.93, SD = 1.28) whereas 
participants high in the personal fear of invalidity became more polarized (M = .17, SD = 
1.44). 
 
 Figure 1. Effects for opportunity for thought and the personal fear of invalidity on 
attitude polarization. 
The following effects were within-subjects effects (i.e., all participants were in 
each condition). There was a significant main effect for initial affect, F(1, 108) = 17.48, p 
< .01. Participants who thought about a descriptor and had positive initial affect 
attenuated (M = -.44, SD = .1.34) whereas participants who thought about a descriptor 
and had negative initial affect polarized (M = .31, SD = 1.37). There was a marginally 
reliable interaction between initial affect and opportunity for thought, F(1, 108) = 3.42, p 
< .07. Participants given a low opportunity for thought expressed more attitude 
polarization when beginning with negative initial affect (M = .57, SD = 1.33) than 
positive initial affect (M = -.50, SD = 1.31). Participants given a high opportunity for 
thought also expressed more attitude polarization when beginning with negative initial 
affect (M = .05, SD = 1.39) than positive initial affect (M = -.38, SD = 1.46). However, 
this difference was more pronounced when participants received a low opportunity for 
thought than high opportunity for thought. 
 
Figure 2. Effects for initial affect and opportunity for thought on attitude polarization. 
Belief Consistency. As a whole, there was no support for our hypotheses 
concerning belief consistency. First, there was no significant main effect for opportunity 
for thought, F < 1.00. Second, there was no significant interaction between opportunity 
for thought and target of thought, F < 1.00. Last, there was no significant interaction 
between opportunity for thought, target of thought, and the personal fear of invalidity, F 
< 1.00. 
However, there were some unexpected effects. The following effects were 
between-subjects effects. There was a marginally reliable interaction between opportunity 
for thought and the personal fear of invalidity F(1, 108) = 3.14, p < .08. There was no 
significant simple main effect of personal fear of invalidity (high personal fear of 
invalidity: M = 1.29, SD = .38; low personal fear of invalidity: M = 1.29, SD = .41) when 
there was low opportunity for thought. There was a significant simple main effect of 
personal fear of invalidity when there was high opportunity for thought. When given high 
opportunity for thought, participants low in the personal fear of invalidity were less 
consistent in their beliefs (M = 1.21, SD = .48) than were participants high in the personal 
fear of invalidity (M = 1.36, SD = .35). 
  
Figure 3. Effects for opportunity for thought and the personal fear of invalidity on belief 
consistency. 
The following effects were within-subjects effects. There was a significant main 
effect for initial affect, F(1, 108) = 18.21, p < .01. Participants who thought about a 
descriptor and had positive initial affect expressed some belief consistency (M = 1.11, SD 
= .64) whereas participants who thought about a descriptor and had negative initial affect 
(M = 1.42, SD = .50) expressed greater belief consistency. There was a significant 
interaction between initial affect and opportunity for thought, F(1, 108) = 5.13, p < .05. 
Participants given a low opportunity for thought expressed more consistent beliefs when 
beginning with negative initial affect (M = 1.53, SD = 1.32) than positive initial affect (M 
= 1.05, SD = .62). Participants given a high opportunity for thought also expressed more 
consistent beliefs when beginning with negative initial affect (M = 1.32, SD = .50) than 
positive initial affect (M = 1.17, SD = .66). However, this difference was more 
pronounced when participants received a low opportunity for thought than high 
opportunity for thought. 
 
Figure 4. Effects for initial affect and opportunity for thought on belief consistency. 
There was also a significant interaction between initial affect, opportunity for 
thought and the personal fear of invalidity, F(1, 108) = 6.30, p < .02. Participants low in 
the fear of invalidity given a low opportunity for thought expressed more consistent 
beliefs when beginning with negative initial affect (M = 1.42, SD = .47) than with 
positive initial affect (M = 1.16, SD = .66); participants high in the fear of invalidity 
given a low opportunity for thought expressed more consistent beliefs when beginning 
 with negative initial affect (M = 1.62, SD = .46) than positive initial affect (M = .95, SD = 
.57) (see Figure 5a). Participants low in the fear of invalidity given a high opportunity for 
thought expressed more consistent beliefs when beginning with negative initial affect (M 
= 1.28, SD = .59) than positive initial affect (M = .96, SD = .64); participants high in the 
fear of invalidity given a high opportunity for thought expressed similarly consistent 
beliefs when beginning with negative initial affect (M = 1.35, SD = .30) and positive 
initial affect (M = 1.37, SD = .62) (see Figure 5b). 
    
Figure 5a & 5b. Effects for initial affect, opportunity for thought, and the personal fear of 
invalidity on belief consistency. 
Secondary Analysis 
Recall the function of macroprocesses in self-generated attitude change. As 
people think longer about an attitude object, their beliefs about that attitude object 
become increasingly consistent (Tesser, 1978). As people’s beliefs about an attitude 
object become increasingly consistent, their feelings about that attitude object become 
increasingly polarized (Tesser, 1978). It was therefore expected that there would be a 
positive correlation between our measures of attitude change and belief consistency. 
Overall, there was support for this expectation, p < .01. Participants who thought about 
the first positive descriptor had a more reliable relationship, r = .51, between attitude 
polarization and belief consistency than participants who thought about the first negative 
descriptor, r = .37. Participants who thought about the second positive descriptor had a 
more reliable relationship, r = .56, between attitude polarization and belief consistency 
than participants who thought about the second negative descriptor, r = .45. 
Manipulation Check 
Remember that people have schemas which these people use to guide their 
thought about an attitude object (Carlston & Smith, 1996). Some schemas are better 
developed than are others (Tesser et al., 1995). Schemas about individuals are better 
developed than are schemas about groups (Britton & Tesser, 1982; Millar & Tesser, 
1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). In this study, participants were instructed to think about 
either an individual target or a group target. The experimenter tested the effectiveness of 
this manipulation using a question in a post-experiment survey which was completed by 
all participants (i.e., “Did you think of any particular people or groups?”). It was expected 
that participants who received the individual condition would be more likely to think 
about a specific person (e.g., Osama bin Laden) during thought than would participants 
who received the group condition. 
We predicted that participants thinking about individual targets should think about 
specific targets rather than nonspecific targets more so than participants thinking about 
 group targets. To test this effect, we conducted a Chi Square analysis. Overall, there was 
no support for our hypothesis that participants should think about a specific target more 
often when told to think about individual targets than group targets, X2 (1, N = 116) < 
1.00. Most participants 62.5% instructed to think about individuals thought about a 
specific individual rebel insurgent. Most participants 70% instructed to think about 
groups thought about a specific group of rebel insurgents. 
Discussion 
Recall our hypotheses. First, we predicted that participant’s attitudes will polarize 
more and have greater belief consistency with an increased amount of time for thought 
than with less amount of time for thought. Second, we predicted that participant’s 
attitudes will polarize more and have greater belief consistency when instructed to think 
about individuals rather than groups and given a high opportunity for thought. Third, we 
predicted that participant’s attitudes will polarize more and have greater belief 
consistency when instructed to think about individuals rather than groups, are given a 
high opportunity for thought, and have a low personal fear of invalidity rather than 
having a high personal fear of invalidity. Contrary to what was expected, none of our 
hypotheses were supported. 
Many researchers have confirmed that simply thinking for a period of time results 
in attitude extremity about an attitude object (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). Tesser 
(1978) hypothesizes that a change in participants’ beliefs is contingent upon thought and 
a change in participants’ feelings is contingent upon a change in participants’ beliefs. 
This macroprocess (i.e., a relationship between thought, beliefs, and feelings) is related to 
microprocesses (i.e., generation of additional consistent beliefs, reinterpretation of 
ambiguous beliefs, and discounting of inconsistent beliefs) in attitude change. 
Participants with more consistent information about an attitude object are more likely to 
polarize than are participants with less consistent information about an attitude object 
(Lord et al., 1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & 
Tordesillas, 1995). 
Although we did not formally hypothesize a relationship between attitude 
polarization and belief consistency, given the literature we would expect as polarization 
increases, belief consistency would also increase (Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser, 1978). 
Consistent with our expectations, we found a positive correlation between attitude 
polarization and belief consistency. This relationship was expected because as 
participants think, they engage in the microprocesses of self-generated attitude change 
(Tesser, 1978). When given time to think, participants’ beliefs should become 
increasingly consistent because consistent beliefs are being generated, ambiguous beliefs 
are being reinterpreted, and inconsistent beliefs are being discounted (Tesser, 1978). 
No difference in attitude polarization or in belief consistency was found when 
participants were given different amounts of time to think and instructed to think about 
different targets. Similarly, this lack of difference was found in participants who were 
high or low in the personal fear of invalidity. Perhaps some participants were not thinking 
and were not engaging in the microprocesses of self-generated attitude change. Attitude 
polarization and belief consistency after thought has been documented when 
experimenters instructed participants to think for differing amounts of time (e.g., Leone 
& Ensley, 1986), when distracted from thought (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985), when 
thinking of fictitious participants (Tesser & Cowan, 1975, 1977), and when thinking of 
 social issues such as the death penalty (Lord et al., 1979). One difference between this 
study and other studies is we asked participants how they felt about rebel insurgents. 
Perhaps our participants had difficulty in thinking about this type of person or this group 
of people. 
No difference in attitude polarization or in belief consistency was found when 
participants thought about individuals or groups. In previous studies, experimenters 
observed that schema complexity was related to attitude polarization by manipulating 
target of thought (e.g., individuals or groups) (Britton & Tesser, 1982; Millar & Tesser, 
1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Participants with more well-developed schemas (e.g., 
individuals) polarized after thought more so than did participants with less well-
developed schemas (e.g., groups) (Britton & Tesser, 1982; Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser 
& Leone, 1977). In previous studies, participants were directed to think about individuals 
or groups of people and were therefore invoking a schema of varying complexity. In the 
current study, we manipulated target of thought and also directed participants to think 
about an individual rebel insurgent or a group of rebel insurgents. 
Perhaps our manipulation of targets did not matter because participants were 
focusing on “rebel insurgent” and disregarding individual and group. If participants were 
unfamiliar with the idea of rebel insurgent, then these participants would have difficulty 
thinking about either an individual rebel insurgent or group of rebel insurgents. That is 
participants who had no idea about rebel insurgents would have no schema for either 
individuals or groups. No difference in attitude polarization or in belief consistency was 
found when participants differing in personal fear of invalidity thought about individuals 
or groups. Differences in the personal fear of invalidity may not have mattered if 
participants had no idea about rebel insurgents. 
There were several unexpected findings for attitude polarization. Contrary to 
Thompson et al. (2001), participants not afraid of being wrong held less extreme attitudes 
after thinking. Perhaps these participants were not engaged in thinking or did not care 
about the topic. Contrary to Thompson et al. (2001), participants afraid of being wrong 
held more extreme after thinking. Perhaps these participants thought long and hard to 
avoid being wrong. 
When participants were given a long time (i.e., 90 seconds) to think, participants 
not afraid of being wrong (i.e., low in the personal fear of invalidity) became less extreme 
and participants afraid of being wrong (i.e., high in the personal fear of invalidity) 
became more extreme. There was no difference between participants given a short time 
(i.e., 30 seconds) to think because they may have felt rushed to report their feelings. 
Participants who feel rushed may respond similarly in regardless of individual 
differences. 
There were several unexpected findings for belief consistency. Contrary to 
Thompson et al. (2001), participants not afraid of being wrong had less consistent beliefs 
after thinking. Perhaps these participants did not feel they had to justify their attitudes. 
Contrary to Thompson et al. (2001), participants afraid of being wrong had more 
consistent beliefs after thinking. Perhaps these participants did feel they had to justify 
their attitudes. 
There were some additional unexpected findings for belief consistency. 
Participants with initially positive affect became less positive after thought, whereas 
participants with initially negative affect became more negative after thought. Perhaps 
 upon being told to think about rebel insurgents, participants engaged a negative schema. 
Engaging a negative schema may have acted as a process constraint (i.e., a restriction on 
thinking) (Leone & Aronow, 1992). Participants may have critically examined their 
initial beliefs and either changed those beliefs if they were not congruent with what they 
were directed to think about (i.e., rebel insurgents) or strengthened those beliefs if they 
were congruent with what they were directed to think about. Perhaps when engaging a 
negative schema, participants tend to call upon more negative beliefs than positive beliefs 
regardless of differences in initial affect, thought condition, or individual differences in 
the fear of being wrong.  
Limitations 
One limitation to this study is that the experimenter could not manipulate the 
personal fear of invalidity. The personal fear of invalidity is a personality difference 
whereby some participants fear being wrong more than do others (Thompson et al., 
2001). The experimenter in this study was unable to randomly assign participants to a 
personality difference condition and was thereby unable to determine causality between 
the personal fear of invalidity and attitude polarization or belief consistency. 
There may have been a limitation by sampling only from a college population. 
After reviewing 50 years of research Sears (1986), found a majority of researchers 
sample from college students. Being able to generalize effects to nonstudent populations 
may not always possible. Although he suggests that most psychological phenomena being 
studied are universal and ever-present, it may be likely that nonstudents are more 
involved than are students, in current events. Nonstudents may have better developed 
ideas about rebel insurgents than would students. 
The experimenter in this study did not know if participants were thinking during 
the entire time given to them. Participants were given either 30 seconds or 90 seconds for 
thought. He instructed participants to think the entire time and notified them when that 
time ended. He could not know for certain that participants were both thinking about a 
specific individual or group and engaging in microprocesses of self-generated attitude 
change (i.e., generation, reinterpretation, and discounting). If participants did not think 
and engage in microprocesses, then participants would not experience attitude 
polarization. 
Although the experimenter in this study manipulated which schemas participants 
used to think about rebel insurgents by telling them to think about either groups or 
individuals, he did not know if participants were only thinking about one target or the 
other. Schema assessment was indirect. Schema assessment could be more direct if 
participants were required to write their thoughts while given opportunity to think rather 
than after given opportunity to think. 
Although the experimenter in this study addressed all questions prior to asking 
participants to think about rebel insurgents, it is possible that some participants still did 
not understand the meaning of rebel insurgent. After a thorough experimenter-led 
discussion of possible meanings and examples of what rebel insurgent meant, the 
experimenter in this study asked participants if they understood its meaning for a second 
time. At this time, all participants replied that they had a good idea of its meaning. One 
possibility is that due to social desirability (i.e., it may have been more desirable to be 
perceived as having knowledge than not having knowledge), participants may have 
responded that they knew the meaning of rebel insurgent when they did not. One 
 alternative to an experimenter-led discussion is to present all participants with a 
colloquial definition and an example of rebel insurgents. Including a question in the post-
experiment debrief inquiring whether or not participants understood the meaning of rebel 
insurgent may help experimenters understand individual differences more clearly than 
without this documentation. 
Future Directions 
Several possible new lines of research can be followed after this study. In future 
studies, researchers may also focus on sampling from older populations or special 
populations (e.g., veterans, international students, political science majors) when using a 
manipulation such as require participants to think about rebel insurgents. In some 
previous studies, experimenters have used a button and clock as a means of measuring 
participants’ thinking (Leone, 1984). Experimenters instructed participants to hold a 
button while thinking that activated a clock to record how long participants were 
thinking. If other experimenters can measure when and how much participants are 
thinking, then other experimenters will be able to more accurately infer if participants are 
thinking and engaging in the microprocesses of self-generated attitude change. In future 
studies, researchers could also manipulate when (e.g., during opportunity for thought, 
after opportunity for thought) participants list their thoughts. Experimenters will then be 
able to measure belief consistency across different conditions. 
The experimenter in this study instructed participants to think about rebel 
insurgents during the rerating portion of this study. Instructing participants to think about 
rebel insurgents may have caused participants to invoke a negative schema (i.e., a mental 
representation invoking negative affective information) (Carlston & Smith, 1996; 
Tulving, 1972; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). A way to test this possibility in the future would 
be to instruct participants to think about freedom fighters instead of rebel insurgents. 
Leaving all other variables and steps within the methodology identical, experimenters 
could measure any difference in attitude polarization and belief consistency when 
participants invoke a positive schema (i.e., a mental representation invoking positive 
affective information) instead of a negative schema (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Tulving, 
1972; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). 
Another way to alter the schema portion of this study could be to instruct 
participants to think about groups of people that are personally relevant to typical 
undergraduates (e.g., professors). Instructing participants to think about professors would 
increase personal relevance and also cause participants to invoke more well-developed 
schemas than less-well developed schemas. Using more well-developed schemas may 
cause increased amounts of attitude polarization (Tesser & Leone, 1977). 
Participants with more well-developed schemas about rebel insurgents or freedom 
fighters than participants with less-well developed schemas could be studied in future 
studies. Participants with more well-developed schemas may include military personnel, 
Latin Americans who were affected by Che Guevara, Eastern Europeans who lived under 
the USSR, or Africans affected by Nelson Mandela. Such participants may polarize more 
and have more well-developed schemas regarding rebel insurgents and freedom fighters 
than participants unaffected by either. Participants who lived in different parts of the 
world may have more, or at least different, experience than participants who have lived 
their entire lives in the United States. 
Summary 
 One possible difference between participants’ reactions to the events on 
September 11, 2001 may be individual differences. Some participants may not have 
reacted because they felt as though they didn’t have enough information. Other 
participants reacted regardless of current information by protesting or approving war. 
Some participants may have not acted initially, but after thinking for a period of time may 
have decided to act in a way congruent with their beliefs. Other participants may have 
decided to stop thinking about terrorist or the events on September 11, 2001 altogether. 
Understanding individual differences between people and ways of thinking are important 
as a way of understanding our personal experience. 
 
References  
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 personality-trait words. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 9(3), 272-279.  
Berzonsky, M. D., & Sullivan, C. (1992). Social-cognitive aspects of identity style: Need 
for cognition, experiential openness, and introspection. Journal of Adolescent 
Research, 7(2), 140-155.  
Britton, B. K., & Tesser, A. (1982). Effects of prior knowledge on use of cognitive 
capacity in three complex cognitive tasks. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal 
Behavior, 21(4), 421-436.  
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1981). Social psychological procedures for cognitive 
response assessment: The thought-listing technique. In T. V. Merluzzi, C. R. Glass, 
& M. Genest (Eds.), Cognitive assessment (pp. 309-342). New York: Guilford Press. 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42(1), 116-131.  
Cacioppo, J. T., von Hippel, W., & Ernst, J. M. (1997). Mapping cognitive structures and 
processes through verbal content: The thought-listing technique. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 928-940.  
Carlson, N. R. (2008). Foundations of Physiological Psychology (7th ed.). New York: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
Carlston, D. E., & Smith, E. R. (1996). Principles of mental representation. New York, 
NY, US: Guilford Press.  
Chaiken, S., & Yates, S. (1985). Affective-cognitive consistency and thought-induced 
attitude polarization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(6), 1470-
1481.  
 Clary, E. G., Tesser, A., & Downing, L. L. (1978). Influence of a salient schema on 
thought-induced cognitive change. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4(1), 
39-43.  
Clow, K. A., & Esses, V. M. (2005). The development of group stereotypes from 
descriptions of group members: An individual difference approach. Group Processes 
& Intergroup Relations, 8(4), 429-445.  
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York, NY, England: 
Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.  
Freund, T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Shpitzajzen, A. (1985). The freezing and unfreezing of 
impressional primacy: Effects of the need for structure and the fear of invalidity. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11(4), 479-487.  
Judd, C. M., & Brauer, M. (1995). Repetition and evaluative extremity. Hillsdale, NJ, 
England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation, 15, 192-238.  
Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: 
Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19(5), 448-468.  
Kruglanski, A. W., & Mayseless, O. (1987). Motivational effects in the social 
comparison of opinions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(5), 834-
842.  
Kruglanski, A. W., & Mayseless, O. (1988). Contextual effects in hypothesis testing: The 
role of competing alternatives and epistemic motivations. Social Cognition, 6(1), 1-
20.  
Lassiter, G. D., & Apple, K. J. (1998). Need for cognition and thought-induced attitude 
polarization: Examining possible demand characteristics. Social Behavior and 
Personality, 26(1), 99-103.  
Leone, C. (1984). Thought-induced change in phobic beliefs: Sometimes it helps, 
sometimes it hurts. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 40(1), 68-71. 
Leone, C. (1995). A review: Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of 
attitudes. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Janovich. Psychology and Marketing, 
12, 459-466. 
Leone, C. (1996). Thought, objectivism, and opinion extremity: Individual differences in 
attitude polarization and attenuation. Personality and Individual Differences, 21(3), 
383-390.  
 Leone, C., & Aronow, R. E. (1992). Thought, process constraints, and cognitive style: 
Individual differences in self-generated reduction of fear. Journal of Social & 
Clinical Psychology, 11(4), 365-376.  
Leone, C., & Ensley, E. (1985). Self-generated attitude change: Another look at the 
effects of thought and cognitive schemata. Representative Research in Social 
Psychology, 15(1-2), 2-9.  
Leone, C., & Ensley, E. (1986). Self-generated attitude change: A person by situation 
analysis of attitude polarization and attenuation. Journal of Research in Personality, 
20(4), 434-446.  
Leone, C., Taylor, L. W., & Adams, K. C. (1991). Self-generated attitude change: Some 
effects of thought, dogmatism, and reality constraints. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 12(3), 233-240.  
Lord, C. G., Paulson, R. M., Sia, T. L., Thomas, J. C., & Lepper, M. R. (2004). Houses 
built on sand: Effects of exemplar stability on susceptibility to attitude change. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 733-749.  
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 2098-2109.  
McGuire, W. J. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. Handbook of Social Psychology, 2, 
233-346.  
Millar, M. G., & Tesser, A. (1986). Thought-induced attitude change: The effects of 
schema structure and commitment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51(2), 259-269.  
Miller, A. G., McHoskey, J. W., Bane, C. M., & Dowd, T. G. (1993). The attitude 
polarization phenomenon: Role of response measure, attitude extremity, and 
behavioral consequences of reported attitude change. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 64(4), 561-574.  
Munro, G. D., & Ditto, P. H. (1997). Biased assimilation, attitude polarization, and affect 
in reactions to stereotyped-relevant scientific information. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 23(6), 636-653.  
Osberg, T. M. (1987). The convergent and discriminant validity of the need for cognition 
scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 51(3), 441-450.  
Petty, R. E., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). An individual differences perspective on 
assessing cognitive processes. San Francisco, CA, US: Jossey-Bass.  
 Pomerantz, E. M., Chaiken, S., & Tordesillas, R. S. (1995). Attitude strength and 
resistance processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(3), 408-419.  
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the 
attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 10  
Sadler, O., & Tesser, A. (1973). Some effects of salience and time upon interpersonal 
hostility and attraction during social isolation. Sociometry, 36(1), 99-112.  
Sadowski, C. J., & Gulgoz, S. (1992). Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the 
need for cognition scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 74(2), 610.  
Sears, D. O. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: Influences of a narrow data 
base on social psychology's view of human nature. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51(3), 515-530.  
Tesser, A. (1978). Self-generated attitude change. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 11, 289-338.  
Tesser, A., Martin, L., & Mendolia, M. (1995). The impact of thought on attitude 
extremity and attitude-behavior consistency. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Tesser, A., & Conlee, M. C. (1975). Some effects of time and thought on attitude 
polarization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(2), 262-270.  
Tesser, A., & Cowan, C. L. (1975). Thought and number of cognitions as determinants of 
attitude change. Social Behavior and Personality, 3(2), 165-173. 
Tesser, A., & Cowan, C. L. (1977). Some attitudinal and cognitive consequences of 
thought. Journal of Research in Personality, 11(2), 216-226.  
Tesser, A., & Leone, C. (1977). Cognitive schemas and thought as determinants of 
attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13(4), 340-356.  
Tesser, A., Leone, C., & Clary, E. G. (1978). Affect control: Process constraints versus 
catharsis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 2(3), 265-274.  
Thompson, M. M., Naccarato, M. E., Parker, K. C. H., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2001). The 
personal need for structure and personal fear of invalidity measures: Historical 
perspectives, current applications, and future directions. Mahwah, NJ, US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.  
Thompson, M. M., & Zanna, M. P. (1995). The conflict individual: Personality-based and 
domain-specific antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes. Journal of Personality, 
63(2), 259-288.  
 Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. Oxford, England: Academic Press.  
Valenti, A. C., & Tesser, A. (1981). On the mechanism of thought-induced attitude 
change. Social Behavior and Personality, 9(1), 17-22.  
Venkatraman, M. P., & Price, L. L. (1990). Differentiating between cognitive and 
sensory innovativeness: Concepts, measurement, and implications. Journal of 
Business Research, 20(4), 293-315.  
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive 
closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049-1062.  
Zanna, M. P. (., & Rempel, J. K. (1988). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. New 
York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press; Paris, France: Editions de la Maison 
des Sciences de l'Homme. 
